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COAL, CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE* 
Zan Phimister 
CRISIS AND CLASS STRUGGLE, 1914 - 1922 
I take it that an attempt is made to push up wages at Wankie 
Colliery in the knowledge that the Wankie Company cannot afford 
to shut the place down in that this would affect the whole country. 
If the question is left to my decision I shall certainly shut the 
Colliery down rather than give effect to the demands outlined in 
your letter. 
(AR Thomson to General Secretary, 
Rhodesian Mine & General Workers' Association) 
During 1914 the colliery's output grew rapidly. "Coal production again shewed an excellent 
increase in output", reported the Secretary for Mines. "The colliery has a good market in 
Belgian territory, in addition to the requirements of Rhodesia ... Tons raised, 349,459; tons 
sold, 265,574; value of sales, £1 15,099. These shew increases on 191 3 of 106,13 1 tons 
raised, 91,916 tons sold and £36,678 in value." [l] With total profits for the year amounting 
to over £50,000, the Wankie Colliery Company announced that its shareholders would 
pocket a record dividend of 25 per cent. [2] Corporate celebrations were tempered, though, 
by a number of considerations. Chief amongst these was the outbreak of World War, three 
months previously, between Britain and her allies and the Central Powers. In this entirely 
new context, large dividends paid on the production of raw materials essential to the Imperial 
war effort were likely to attract accusations of pmfiteering. Nor was local reaction any more 
encouraging. The Rhodesia Chamber of Mnes sourly remarked "in connection with the 
dividend of 25 per cent, paid by the Wankie Colliery CO .... that [as] the shareholders are 
beginning to be recouped for their early losses and misfortunes, ... naturally we hope that the 
price of coal will be reduced in the near futm". [3] 
B 
Acutely aware of the Colliery Company's exposed position on what was becoming 
increasingly unfriendly terrain, Wankie's board of directors lost little time in lowering the 
company's financial profile. At the end of December 1914 the Company was again 
reconstructed. A new company was formed with the same name as before, but this time its 
capital was written up instead of down. Nominal capital foxmation was doubled to £410,000, 
divided into 820,000 shares of ten shillings each, of which 8 10,466 shares were allotted as 
fully paid on the basis of two new shares for one old ten-shilling share. At the same time, the 
value of the Company's mining rights was increased from £166,281 to £347,559, even as 
shareholders were discreetly rewarded with the further sum of £20,000 "retained for 
distribution amongst members of the old Company on its liquidation". [4] 
This drastic upwards revision of the CompanyWs capitalization had the desired effect. 
Combined with a reduction in the price of coal from nine shillings to eight shillings and 
sixpence per ton, it significantly depressed the colliery's apparent profitability. The dividend 
declared for the financial year ending 31 August 1915 tumbled to a modest 7 1/2 per 
cent . [5] As a leading member of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly later 
observed, it all "meant that ... an amount of wind, water, or whatever you may call it, of 
* This paper forms part of a longer work on the Wankie coal fields, currently under preparation. 
£202,000 was injected into the affair". Operations of this kind, he added, were "somewhat 
typical" of companies dealing in 
a necessary commodity of life, because these concerns never like 
to show they are paying too large a dividend. It looks too bad. 
If you find a flour-miller paying 50 per cent dividends, the next 
thing that is said is that he is a profiteer and ought to be hanged on 
a lamp-post. [6] 
Far from coming to the sticky end wished upon it by its critics, the Colliery Company 
initially enjoyed an extended run of successes. War-time demand for coal expanded from 
1 year to year. Soaring exports of coal, and especially coke to the Katanga copper mines of Union Minihe, were augmented by growing local consumption as more and more gold mines 
switched from wood to coal fuel. Coal production in 1915 increased by almost 17 per cent 
over the tonnage raised the previous year, and jumped by a further 20 per cent in 1916 [7] 
"The Wankie Colliery fully met all requirements, both in coal and coke, in addition to large 
consignments to Belgian territory", noted one report, "and an increase in output has again to 
I be recorded." [8] By 1917 annual coal production had risen to 548,954 tons, of which 
~125,000 tons were used for coke. Sales and profits both surged to the point where neither 
I the redemption of debentures totalling £14,080 nor another tiny reduction in the price of coal 
much affected the Colliery Company's onwards rush. At twelve and a half per cent and 
fifteen per cent, respectively, year-end dividends in 1916 and 1917 were once again 
assuming embarrassing dimensions. [g] 
As in the past, however, the colliery's fortunes ultimately turned on the regular supply of 
cheap black labour, and, in the absence of capital investment, this dependency became 
increasingly pronounced as the war continued. Apart from badly needed water tube boilers 
, installed in 1914, Wankie's board of directors refused to sanction the purchase of additional 
capital equipment. [l01 Expanded output was instead won through the simple expedient of 
I increasing the size of the labour force. By drawing on the flood of migrant workers initially 
compelled to seek wage employment by the tax regime enforced by the BSA Company 
Administration north of the Zambezi, and latterly propelled by the need to avoid conscription 
I into the carrier legions deployed in Britain's East Africa campaign, Wankie's general 
l manager steadily increased the number of workers on the company's books. Between 1913 
I and 1917 the number of black workers at the colliery grew from c650 to slightly more than 
l 2,000 [l l], the majority of whom were employed underground as lashers and trammers, that 
is, as unskilled labourers filling and pushing tubs of coal. [l23 
Over much the same period, concerted and largely successful efforts were also made to 
minimise expenditure on black miners' food and wages. As shown by the Table below, the 
l unit costs of labour dropped noticeably during the war. Compared to other Southern 
1 Rhodesian mines, wages on the colliery were extremely low by 19 18. Average deferred pay 
FOOD AND WAGES PER SHIFT WORKED [l3] 
Year Cost of food Wages paid 
ending per shift worked per shift worked 
(pence) (pence) 
July 1915 
July 1916 7.47 1 1.25 
July 1917 7.04 11.33 
For l l months 
end in^ June 6.86 11.27 
earned by Bureau recruits after 12 months' work in the gold mining industry varied between 
£5.10.5 on small mines, and £7.17.3. on larger mines towards the top end of the scale. At 
Wankie the equivalent figure was £4.14.7., a difference which even the hardened managing 
director of the RNLB was moved to describe as "remarkable". [l41 
But in the process of changing the size and conditions of service of the colliery's labour 
force, Thomson drastically altered its composition as well. The unspecified but tiny 
proportion of "voluntary" labour still remaining at Wankie once the outbreak of scurvy 
finally subsided, in 1913, grew rapidly in the following years. By the end of 1917, "free 
labour", as Thomson called it, accounted for about three-fifths of all Wankie's black 
workers. [l51 Almost all of them came from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). "The best class of 
native labour we obtain", he explained, "comes from around Fort Jarneson [Chipata], mainly 
Angoni [Ngoni] and Mushukulumbwe[lna] natives, with natives of the Zarnbesi Valley 
[Tonga] a good second. There are a certain number of natives now coming down from 
Barotseland." [l61 The dwindling balance of "unfree labour", also very largely drawn from 
across the Zambezi, was made up by RNLB recruits. "Of the 2000 natives [employed at 
Wankie] 60% applied for work at the Colliery Off ice which does not indicate that the place 
is unduly unpopular", boasted the colliery's general manager. "During these years no 
Recruiters were employed by the Colliery, all labour required (other than free labour) being 
received from the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau." [l71 
Consequently, the foundations on which Wankie's productive capacity rested were extremely 
narrow, and the colliery was severely shaken when the supply of labour from Northern 
Rhodesia abruptly dried up in the first half of 1918. There were five interconnected reasons 
why this happened. In the first place, the number of "voluntary" workers appearing at the 
colliery's compound gates dropped off as the escalating cost of living made Wankie's falling 
cash wages daily more unattractive. After a period of relatively gradual price increases, the 
rate of inflation accelerated in the last stages of the war and its immediate aftermath. A 
commission of enquiry, appointed by the Beira & Mashonaland & Rhodesia Railway 
Company, established that the cost of clothing, to take only one example, had increased by 
roughly 100 per cent [l81 As a result, many people could "no longer afford to buy blankets 
and clothing as they used to". "The majority of boys working on mines and farms are clad in 
sacks", reported the CNC. 1191 Overall, the cost of living was later estimated by the Native 
Department to have risen by 165 per cent between 1'914 and 1920. [20] 
The adverse impact of inflation on the colliery's labour supply was greatly aggravated by two 
further developments. In January 1918 large areas of Northern Rhodesia were closed to 
labour recruiting as various detachments of British Imperial forces plodded southwards after 
the elusive columns of General von Lettow-Vorbeck, military commander of German East 
Africa. Although warned by the RNLB that "there would be some difficulty in fulfilling 
labour requirements for the coming year" 1211, the colliery's management remained fairly 
unperturbed until it realised that very few "voluntary" workers were arriving either. Along 
with thousands of labour migrants from northern and western Nyasaland (Malawi), many 
Northern Rhodesian workers took to entering Southern Rhodesia by way of Feira in 
Mozambique. 1221 By crossing into Portuguese East Afsica as soon as possible on their 
journey south, labourers could avoid the widening zone of British territory in which all able- 
bodied men were pressed into carrier service. As the centre of gravity of labour migration 
routes shifted eastwards to the enduring benefit of Mashonaland mines and farms, the flow of 
labour reaching Wankie slowed to a trickle. [23] Whereas the colliery's location in a remote 
north-western corner of Southern Rhodesia had previously placed it astride one of the major 
routes taken by n0rther.n migrants, it now found itself out on a limb. 
Although this awkward position could not have been maintained for long at the best of times, 
it was made very much more precarious by the fact that the contraction in Wankie's labour 
supply coincided with enormously expanded demand for coal. Already committed to large 
new coking and coal contracts for the Katanga mines [24], Thomson was quite unable to 
satisfy the burgeoning requirements of Rhodesia Railways. Contrary to expectations, demand 
from this source increased by about ten per cent .per annum in the final years of the war. By 
mid-1918 the railways were consuming about 12,000 tons of coal each month, and were the 
colliery's largest customer. [25] Nor was he able to respond to an urgent request early in the 
New Year from the Royal Navy for upwards of 2,000 tons of coal each month for its coding 
station at Beira. Apart from a single shipment of 1,000 tons which hardly placated the frantic 
Fleet transport officer for a moment, Wankie had to turn a deaf ear to the normally 
irresistible call of patriotism and profit. [26] Indeed, far from rising, its coal output was 
actually dropping. In April 1918 the colliery only "despatched 16,257 tons of coal ... out of 
30,068 tons asked for". [27] 
By the time that point was reached, a familiar pattern had re-emerged. The rising demand for 
coal and the falling supply of labour were very quickly translated into hugely intensified 
pressure on the remaining workers. All leave was cancelled, and Sunday work reinstituted as 
the colliery worked day and night shifts. 1281 In the interest of greater production, surface 
workers were forced to labour underground. As a later committee of enquiry discovered, 
"when the Mine was short of labour, even the Compound Sanitary gang had been used for 
work elsewhere". [29] The length of shifts also increased significantly, though less by design 
than through the chaos and confusion which characterised the colliery's underground 
operations. For most of the war, the colliery management had economised on capital 
expenditure by stripping wire rope from side haulages in order to keep the main ropeway in a 
reasonable state of repair. [30] But this practice of robbing Peter to pay Paul eventually 
resulted in considerable congestion around the main haulage. Black miners, who even the 
colliery's unyielding management admitted "were on their feet throughout the working 
day"[31], endured endless delays as they struggled to position full tubs and retrieve empty 
ones from a system which was dangerously over-loaded. "There is difficulty in getting tubs 
in rotation", conceded Thornson, "and the time [spent underground] may be extended due to 
this reason." [32] 
Pushed beyond the limits of their physical endurance by black foremen or "boss boys" who 
were as quick with their fists and feet as white miners had ever been, the health of many 
black labourers deteriorated rapidly. "No man engaged in strenuous physical effort is 
constantly up to the full pitch of his abilities", explained the Colony's medical director. 
He feels that he must have relaxation or a break, in order to rest, 
the desire being a physiological one, and arising out of the 
necessity of muscles and nerves for a period of rest. If this rest is 
not given him, or if he does not take it, his powers of resistance to 
disease are lowered, and his liability to sickness increased. [33] 
In short, "the heavier the work and the longer the hours, the higher the sickness rate amongst 
the workers". [34] 
Underground workers covered in coal dust and "subject as they were to cuts, scratches and 
abrasions in the course of their occupation", began developing large open sores, so-called 
"tropical ulcers", on their legs and arms. In extreme cases, these suppurating sores led to 
limbs being amputated, and even to death. As labourers were issued with no protective 
clothing whatsoever, wounds were constantly reopened and reinfected. In any case, they 
were seldom properly cleaned. There was no change house at the colliery for black miners, 
such bathing arrangements as there were comprising "an uncovered cement bath, more nearly 
resembling a tank ...[ filled with] black coal water ... [which] had to suffice for over 2,000 
labourers". [35] Many workers, naturally enough, gave the bath a wide berth, but the main 
compound in which most of them were housed was itself a major source of infection and 
disease, especially once all the cleaning gangs had been redirected to underground labour. 
Badly sited and difficult to keep clean under ordinary circumstances [36], the compound was 
left to swelter in Wankie's 34 " C heat, amidst growing piles of uncollected rubbish, for the 
greater part of 1918. Visitors to the compound remarked on its filthy state. It was "neither 
clean nor sanitary ... refuse of all sorts was noticeable". [37] 
Nor was the "native" hospital much help to sick and exhausted workers. Although the 
existing building had been officially condemned years previously as "totally inadequate", 
"too small" and otherwise unsuitable for the daily rate of sickness [38], the construction of a 
new hospital had been repeatedly subordinated to the imperatives of accumulation. Requests 
that the situation be remedied as a matter of urgency were invariably met with a shrug of the 
shoulders: "the General Manager says he had no labour and as soon as certain coke ovens 
are completed the building will be commenced". [39] There was only one doctor, a 
Dr Sutherland, who had replaced the unfortunate Hewetson in 1913. He was helped by a 
clerk who dispensed medicine, and by ten orderlies who "were not trained Assistants but the 
best Natives he could get". [40] They were, however, responsible for "a good dea" of the 
"actual treatmentyy of patients. Hospital records were fragmentary and incomplete, and the 
general air of indifference which permeated the place matched Sutherland's own prejudices 
perfectly. When asked why so many miners avoided using the colliery bath, the man of 
science "advanced the theory that many natives cordially disliked washing". [41] 
By February 1918 ulcers were already covering the limbs of dozens of workers. Two months 
later, some 200 miners were similarly affected. In May, when "the Ulcer trouble assumed the 
proportions of an Epidemic", the total had risen to over 400, of whom 250 of the worst cases 
were belatedly sent to a convalescent camp established at the confluence of the Dekka and 
Zambezi rivers. Thoroughly alarmed by this state of affairs, hundreds of other workers began 
leaving the mine. The number of desertions, which anyway had been climbing steadily since 
the beginning of 1918, now rocketed. Worse still from the management's point of view, "in 
returning to their homes these natives advised other natives not to proceed to Wankie on 
account of the abnormal sickness". Halfway through the year, the colliery was in crisis, the 
"outbreak of Tropical Ulcers ... [having] developed to an alarming extent incapacitating a 
large number of natives and creating wholesale desertions and disorganisation". [42] 
Unwilling or unable to grasp the magnitude of the crisis unfolding before him, Thomson's 
response was initially confined to a series of ad hoc arrangements with private labour 
recruiters who operated inside Southern Rhodesia itself. When these agents all too 
predictably failed to deliver anything like the necessary number of recruits, the colliery's 
compound manager "was sent to Livingstone to find out what could be done in recruiting the 
labour required ... [but] the Secretary for Native Affairs [in Northern Rhodesia] was not 
sympathetic" [43] Only then did Thomson turn to the Southern Rhodesian Administrator, Sir 
Drumrnond Chaplin, for help. Writing towards the end of April, and blandly attributing the 
"seriousness of the Colliery's position ...[ to] an abnormal season interfering somewhat with 
voluntary labour seeking work while the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau's recruiting areas 
have been restricted for Military reasons" [44], Thomson made two demands. He requested 
prior and preferential treatment from the RNLB, as well as "leave to recruit North of the 
Zambesi". "It is perhaps superfluous to point out to you", he concluded, 
that I am not asking your assistance on behalf of the Colliery as a 
Colliery in that if the Colliery was a self-contained enterprise the 
shortage of labour would only concern the Colliery and we could 
not hope for you to be personally interested in the matter. The 
position is, however, one of National importance in that if the 
Colliery fails to supply the fuel required throughout the country all 
industry depending on coal fuel will be affected. [45] 
The point was not lost on the Salisbury Administration. Letters were promptly sent to the 
Bureau inviting it to "consider the possibility of giving the Colliery specially favourable 
treatment in the supply of natives", and to the Northern Rhodesian Administration asking it 
to lift the embargo placed on recruiting, at least so far as Wankie was concerned. [46] These 
steps were followed up in May by the despatch of the Colony's medical director, Andrew 
Fleming, to Wankie. Fleming, an entirely unsentimental but thoroughly professional doctor, 
quickly sized up the prevailing situation. "The demands of the Wankie Colliery are 
considerably in excess of the labour available", he reported, "and in consequence there is a 
tendency to push the labourers unduly. The direct consequence of this is to increase the 
normal sick rate, and so a vicious circle is established." [47] For the immediate relief of 
suffering, he prescribed liberal applications of iodine. Over a longer period, Fleming argued, 
the remedy lay 
in having a surplus of labour which ... [would] allow the labourer 
so many days off in every month, without necessarily interfering 
with the output of the mine ... Though the native cannot expresss it, 
he feels himself the necessity for these days of idleness, and mines 
where he is pressed, and where he is forced to work beyond his 
capabilities, become deservedly unpopular. [48] 
Wankie's general manager rarely took the longer view, however. With the "epidemic of 
tropical ulcers" showing signs of abating after Fleming's visit, and confident that the 
colliery's future labour supply was assured, Thomson characteristically ignored the medical 
director's advice. Far from addressing the structural causes of the colliery's recurrent 
production crises, he concentrated his energies instead on satisfying the short-term demands 
of what was easily Wankie's most lucrative market. As coke sales were "much more 
profitable to the Colliery than coal sales" [49], the first contingent of some 200 "chibaro 
boys" to reach Wankie at the start of June were all put to work on coke oven 
construction. 1501 All in all, 28 bee-hive ovens and retorts were built. [51] 
Having just invoked Wankie's position as "one of National importance" in order to obtain 
labour, Thomson and the Colliery Company's supremely self-interested board of directors 
were quite prepared to leave Southern Rhodesian consumers in the lurch. Some of the biggest 
mines in the Colony were "incensed Ito discover1 that with the growth of the more lucrative 
coke business their coal requirements suffer[ed]. [52] By diverting a steadily growing 
proportion of Wankie's falling coal output into coke production, Thomson succeeded in 
keeping the colliery9 s coke sales close to the record level achieved in 1917. [53] "Shamva, 
Falcon, Globe & Phoenix, [and the] Cam & Motor [all] used to get their supplies in the form 
of peas, nuts and smalls [54], but nearly all of this has been stopped as the coke requirements 
of the Congo have increased so greatly", complained the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines. 
"There is no safeguard of control to ensure that regular supplies to Southern Rhodesia will be 
maintained or to prevent supplies being sent to the Congo or elsewhere to the detriment of 
this country." [55] 
For the entire period that coke oven construction was energetically pushed ahead, nothing at 
all was done to reduce pressure on the remaining tramrners and lashes. Indeed, it gradually 
increased with every new desertion. Yet almost two months passed before Thomson turned 
his attention to the worsening situation underground . "I have a message from the Rhodesian 
Native Labour Bureau", he informed the Administration early in July, "stating that 98 boys 
of whom 78 are underground labourers have been allotted to us. In addition to these, 28 
underground labourers are on their way here now. This number, together with the 100 natives 
coming forward from Shamva, should make a considerable difference to our output from the 
middle of next week when the boys should be on the place." "This being so", he incautiously 
added, "we should be able to allocate to Beira for Naval purposes at least 2,000 tons of coal 
per month and I think this quantity can safely be promised." [56] 
Less than one week later, Thomson was sounding a very different tune. The promised RNLB 
recruits had not arrived. Nor could the Bureau provide the colliery with "definite 
information ... as to what steps they are taking regarding recruiting natives for us in Northern 
Rhodesia". [57] In any event, as Thomson was now forced to acknowledge, expanded output 
also depended on the arrival of a new supply of wire rope for Wankie's much depleted 
haulage system. Stocks had been run down earlier in the war with little thought given to their 
replacement, and orders placed since the beginning of the year had encountered lengthy 
delays. Britain's iron and steel industry was working overtime to help meet the challenge of 
Ludendorff's spring offensive on the Western Front, and shipping space was at a premium. 
"We require considerably more rope which the Home people are doing their best to ship", 
explained Thomson. "10,000 ft. have just arrived and 20,000 ft. are advised. We will 
conserve the use of this as much as possible but extensions to several main haulages are now 
necessary and we cannot afford to re-equip the haulages stripped until we have fair 
stocks." [58] There would be no increase in the tonnage raised, and certainly no possibility of 
meeting the RoyaL Navy's recently revised requirements of 2,500 tons of coal per month, 
unless the colliery was "granted supplies of labour wire rope and other mining stores" . [59] 
But it was precisely these same three elements which continued to remain in short supply. By 
mid-August fewer than 20 out of more than 300 recruits promised for the colliery had 
arrived. [60] When new "'chibaro boys" were told their destination, they "refused to 
proceed to the Colliery". So-called "voluntary" workers were no less emphatic in their 
avoidance of the place: "Mr Posselt the Native commissioner at Wankies stressed the fact 
that natives seeking work would not go to the Colliery but preferred to travel long distances 
to other mines in the Country." [61] Even more damaging to the colliery's prospects was the 
seemingly unstoppable haemorrhage of the remaining workforce. "The Collierys strength has 
decreased by over 100 boys within the last three weeks", confessed Thomson, "due to natives 
leaving, desertions and a certain amount of loafing ... The mine is suffering." [62] 
Desperately lacking labour, Wankie colliery was also cripplingly short of machinery and 
supplies. To some extent this reflected the difficulty of obtaining mining equipment in war- 
time. Mostly, though, it expressed the Colliery Company's consistent failure to capitalise the 
colliery at the point of production. Output was not only severely handicapped by the shortage 
of wire rope, but also by the fact that the main haulage itself depended on a single hauling 
machine which had been in constant use since 1904. As Thomson later testified, "if a serious 
breakdown of this engine occurred the haulage of any coal would be stopped for an 
appreciable period". [63] Problems created by inadequate haulage capacity were 
compounded by obsolete and "often overcrow&d" coal screening, sorting, and washing plant 
and machinery. "The equipment was designed for day shift work when owing to conditions 
of light better sorting can be obtained", noted one report on Wankie's equipment and 
capacity, "but on account of the demand for coal, night shift sorting has had to be resorted 
[to], which has resulted in a higher percentage of shale and dross." [64] A similar conclusion 
was reached by the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines after it had made its own investigation into 
the colliery. Because the mine was under-equipped, existing plant and machinery were 
overloaded and inefficiently utilised. [65] 
Refusing to admit that the renewed crisis was of the Colliery Company's and his own 
making, Thomson stubbornly maintained that the colliery's problems had nothing to do with 
low wages and over-work. His initial and most vehemently defended position was that "the 
whole question" of Wankie's labour shortage could only be explained in terms of "native 
prejudice". Firing off a letter to the Administrator at the end of July, Thomson claimed that 
there is in the native mind the same prejudice to Wankie as exists 
among quite a number of white inhabitants of the country. They 
come to Wankie with the preconceived idea that the place is 
unhealthy and on the appearance of the slightest ache or pain which 
would pass unnoticed if they were in another part of the country 
which has not WankieY.s reputation they wish to leave immediately. [66] 
When the number of workers "wishing to leave immediately" showed no sign of falling, 
however, the colliery's general manager began to give ground, slowly at first and then fairly 
rapidly. While still unable to discover "any cause connected with the treatment of natives or 
their pay to account for their disinclination to work here", Thomson decided that "there must 
be something wrong with the Compound administration". [67] In mid-August he dismissed 
the colliery's compound manager, "and with this am making several radical changes in 
connection with the Compound". In quick succession, a rather more systematic and 
somewhat less unsympathetic compound regime was instituted, and the ration scale improved 
by the issue of extra meat. [68] Hopeful that "an improvement should set in just as soon as 
the new Compound Manager gets abreast of his work", Thomson none the less belatedly 
recognised that the colliery would not '"et any good supplies of independent labour until 
such time as we are able to build up a labour force in excess of what the Mine has got to do 
in order to allow a certain amount of loafing at times which will not interfere with the 
Company's business". C691 
Faced with the seemingly intractable problem of how to get to that point from where he was, 
when "arrears in orders ... [were] such that we cannot possibly allow natives to go slow for a 
month or two even if we had our full complement" [70], Thomson eventually found a 
solution, less because of his own efforts than through a combination of events, which 
radically reshaped the terrain on which the colliery operated. The first of these concerned 
Rhodesia Railways. Short of staff and supplies for most of the war, the railway system had 
become increasingly over-stretched. In September 1918 it finally snapped. A sudden influx at 
Beira of ships from a scattered convoy found the railway authorities quite unable to cope. 
While railway trucks "accumulated in the vicinity of the port", Southern Rhodesia's smaller 
towns and remoter industries were left to fend for themselves. For two days no coal was 
moved from Wankie. L711 
Seizing on the transport crisis as further proof that the coal shortage was not the colliery 
management's fault, Wankie's general manager began calling for an official investigation. 
Some weeks earlier Thomson had studiously ignored a throw-away suggestion by the 
RNLB's managing director that "in the event of all else failing, you ask His Honour the 
Administrator to appoint a small commission of enquiry to help you in definitely ascertaining 
the causes of the complaints by natives concerning the mine", but in the comparatively 
favourable climate brought about by the breakdown of regular rail services, he now courted 
"such remedies as ... [would] place matters upon a permanently satisfactory footing". [72] 
For its own reasons, the Administration agreed. Despite its manifest opportunism, 
Thomson's call for a commission of enquiry would at least allow the state to create the 
illusion of doing something even when it had no intention of taking any serious action. At the 
end of September, the appointment of a small committee "to investigate labour and other 
recent troubles at the Wankie Colliery" was announced. 
The composition of the committee and its terms of reference were compromised from the 
start. Because "the appointment of the Committee emanated from the Wankie Company", 
solemnly announced the Mines Department, "they [would be allowed to] select the 
members" [73] The Colliery Company prudently chose Ernest Montagu, the crusty Secretary 
for Mines, as chairman. The balance of the committee comprised a mining engineer from the 
Globe & Phoenix, the one big mine in the country with a recordworse than Wankie's; a 
mechanical engineer, the managing director of the RNLB; and a traffic manager from the 
railways. By successfully muddying the waters around the whole question of the coal 
shortage, the Colliery Company were also able to insist that the committee include the 
railways within the scope of its deliberations. But, most important of all, the cynical 
construction of the committee encapsulated the much n m w e r  role which the Company state 
was prepared to play in Southern Fthodesian economy and society following the Privy 
Council decision of July 1918 that ownership of the Colony's so-called unalienated land was 
vested in the Crown and not the BSA Company. Stripped of its most valuable commercial 
asset, the Chartered Company "saw no further point in subsidising administrative deficits, 
and told its shareholders that 'since the land is not yours, capital for its further development 
must be sought elsewhere than from you"'. [74] While still ostensibly representing capital in 
general, the Company state increasingly looked to its own. Long after the stage was reached 
where any further indulgence of the colliery's antics would threaten the interests of the 
mining industry as a whole [75], the Administration in Salisbury continued to extend every 
possible consideration to the Wankie Colliery Company. 
On the evening of 5 October, the Committee's members assembled at Wankie station. They 
spent the next three days taking evidence and touring the colliery. Not surprisingly, their 
findings were wholly consistent with the Chartered Company's preoccupation with the 
interests of the more profitable parts of its remaining financial empire after the Privy 
Council's decision. "The following reasons are entirely accountable for the recent shortage 
of coal", concluded the Committee. 
1. The outbreak of Topical Ulcers which ... continued almost 
unchecked until May. This outbreak does not appear to have 
been promptly dealt with ... 
2. Inefficient control over the Compound, including medical 
treatment of natives. 
3. That to cope with the increased business ... the Colliery 
Management were compelled to run their mechanical equipment 
on a twenty-four hour basis ... These conditions were of course 
brought about owing to the impossibility of being able to purchase 
any of the necessary equipment during the War ... 
4. For a certain period the falling off of Coal supplies was entirely 
due to shortage of railway trucks. r/6] 
Thomson himself, declared the Committee, was "to be congratulated on the way he has kept 
the Colliery going ... [despite] labour troubles and other difficulties which have arisen owing 
to the war". [77] 
Taken as a whole, the Committee's findings "exonerated and white-washed" the colliery's 
management. [78] Such censure as the Committee expressed was confined to "the care of the 
sick and the medical arrangements generally" [79], and to the way the compound had been 
run for the first eight months of the year. "It is plain", commented the final report, "that the 
late Compound Manager, whom Mr Thomson dismissed in August 1918, did not rise to his 
responsibilities and was unsympathetic in his treatment of the boys." [80] Its other 
comments and recommendations were hardy meant to be taken seriously. The colliery's 
wrist was slapped for practices which often went unremarked and invariably unchecked 
elsewhere in the Southern Rhodesian mining industry. [81] Thomson was gently chided for 
paying "voluntary labour a higher wage than prevailed under Bureau contracts, with the 
result that a Bureau and Voluntary boy of the same length of service would be doing the 
same class of work with an appreciable difference in pay". The Committee thought that this 
was a "fruitful source of discontent especially amongst the Bureau natives", and, although 
pleased to hear that the system of differential pay had recently been altered, felt that it needed 
to be explained carefully to "the boys". The colliery's management was also mildly rebuked 
for permitting "a monopoly in the sale of 'Kaffir truck"'. "There is only one store on the 
property ... and in evidence it was shewn that the boys when they were able, walked six miles 
to the nearest store off the property to make purchases ... [and] we consider that competition 
should be encouraged as far as possible." [82] None of this detracted from the Enquiry's 
bottom line, however: the Committee's unanimous "desire to place on record our 
appreciation of Mr Thomson's work under very difficult conditions". 1831 
The only dissenting official voice was that of the Colony's medical director. Infuriated by the 
Committee's attempt to place most of the blame for the "recent troubles" at Wankie on the 
colliery's doctor, Fleming sharply reminded the Administrator that 
though it is admitted that the chief cause of the troubles arose out 
of the health and sanitary conditions prevailing, there was no 
medical member of the Committee who could guide the 
Committee in their deliberations or advise them as to their 
findings. This at the outset appears to me a serious drawback to 
the usefulness of the Report generally [84] 
While holding "no brief whatsoever for Dr Sutherland or the Medical Staff of the Wankie 
Colliery whatsoever", added Fleming, "I have read through the evidence as given by him 
most carefully, and I must conscientiously state that were this Report submitted to an 
independent Committee of experts in public health and sanitation, I feel sure that the findings 
of the Committee in many respects would not be upheld". The basic problem, argued the 
medical director, was the utterly inadequate medical facilities with which Sutherland had to 
work. "That a better supervision of the compound sanitation and hygiene, together with 
perhaps a more effective attempt at the prevention of disease, might have been exercised, I 
for one am not prepared to doubt", wrote Fleming, "but the failures here are the failures of 
the system rather than of the individual." [85] 
This one discordant note was barely heard in the general chorus of Administrative support for 
the Committee's findings, and was anyway suppressed as soon as was decently possible. "I 
cannot see that any good purpose would be served by sending Dr Fleming's letter to other 
members of the Committee", minuted the Secretary for Mines. 1861 Nor did Sir Drumond 
Chaplin himself have any difficulty in swallowing the Committee's assurances that the 
colliery's underground labourers were not overworked. Reassured to hear that the "task of 
tramwing and lashing is not too severe", the Administrator readily concurred with the 
Committee's conclusion that one of the main causes of the "native trouble was inefficient and 
unsympathetic compound management". [87] As a result, his confidential report to the BSA 
Company in London merely observed that "effect is already being given to some of the 
recommendations of the Committee ...[ and] I should hope, therefore that the conditions on 
the surface affecting the native employees will show considerable improvement". [$$l 
The Committee of Enquiry's endorsement of Wankie's management, and the Chartered 
Company's manifest reluctance to criticise the Colliery Company, together smoothed the 
way for even greater state involvement in dealing with the colliery's labour shortage. These 
preparations became extremely urgent in the course of October when the Spanish Influenza 
pandemic, which ultimately claimed some 20 million lives around the world, swept through 
the Colony. The first cases of influenza occurred early in the month amongst railway workers 
in Bulawayo. From there the epidemic spread swiftly to Gwelo (Gweru), Que Que (Kwekwe) 
and Salisbury (Harare), before engulfing other towns and districts along the line of rail. [89] 
Wankie's turn came on 14 October, and "in the space of a few days nearly two thousand 
natives were prostrated". "'The resources of the Colliery management were taxed to the 
uttermost in giving relief, as a large number of the Europeans also contracted the epidemic", 
reported the local NC. "All available Europeans were enlisted in nursing the sick Natives, 
and everything possible done to combat the scourge." [90] 
The influenza pandemic struck the colliery with explosive force. Like most other large 
Southern Rhodesian mines, Wankie's overcrowded, filthy compound provided optimum 
conditions for the rapid spread of the disease. Underground labourers, subject to variations in 
temperature as they left hot and confined working conditions below ground for the surface 
where there were no change houses, tended to suffer most from the pandemic. Hundreds of 
miners drew the appropriate conclusion, and fled from the compound into the surrounding 
countryside. Some undoubtedly carried infection into outlying villages, but many more 
unquestionably saved their own lives by escaping from the colliery. By 24 October, an 
estimated 100 black workers had died, an8 by the end of the month, the total number of dead 
had moR than doubled. One white miner died in the same period. [g13 
For nearly two weeks Wankie was at a complete standstill. With no stockpile of coal to draw 
on, the colliery's sales stopped as soon as production ceased. After ten days, Thomson sent a 
telegram to the Mines Department explaining that while he thought "the worst is now past ... 
it ... [would] be Monday earliest before we can get a shift undergroun&'. As the Colony's 
'Tuel position was a most serious one", Thomson formally requested that the Administration 
either supply Wankie with labour, or that other mines be compelled to "loan" workers to the 
colliery until matters were back to normal. [92] On the 26 October, "mining operations, 
though on a very limited scale, were resumed ... the natives thereafter rapidly returning to 
work". [93] 
The state addressed the problem of keeping the colliery supplied with labour in two ways. As 
an emergency step, the Administration secured Imperial agreement to the use of convict 
labour at Wankie. Because of the "dislocation caused by influenza and the importance of 
Wankie coal to the war effort", the High Commissioner for South Africa sanctioned the 
unpaid employment for three months of 200 convicts. This temporary relief was bolstered by 
the lifting of all remaining restrictions on RNLB recruitment in Northern Rhodesia 
immediately after the announcement on 11 November of the armistice ending the First World 
War. [94] Between them, these measures greatly facilitated Wankie's return to something 
approaching full-scale production in the last six weeks of 1918, but for all the state's efforts, 
the supply of labour none the less remained well below the level needed to maximize output 
for any length of time. [95] The recovery soon faltered, and output dropped in the New Year. 
By February 1919 the colliery was estimated to be "400 short of its proper complement", and 
as pressure on the underground work-force built up once more, so "tropical ulcers" began 
reappearing in "considerable numbers". [96] 
As the colliery again teetered on the edge of crisis, it was rescued at the last minute by 
Rhodesia Railways' recurrent inability to muster sufficient rolling stock. During February, 
the railways served notice that they could no longer "get away the coal as fast as the mine 
can raise it". "This ... [plus] the fact that under present circumstances ... the coal cannot 
profitably be stored on the surface", reported the newly-appointed compound inspector for 
the sprawling Bulawayo mining district, "saves the labourers from being called upon to do 
too heavy a task". [97] It also saved many of them from meeting what would undoubtedly 
have been an unpleasant fate in the colliery's "native hospital", described as "so saturated 
with infection that the smallest wound brought in for dressings always becomes septic". [98] 
This breathing-space, which officials feared would come to an abrupt end "should the 
Railway manage to get up more trucks before the mine gets more natives" [99], lasted just 
long enough for Wankie's replacement medical officer hastily to commission a new hospital 
building, and to insist on the installation of incinerators for the disposal of compound refuse. 
In the same period, the colliery's management increased the wages of black miners by an 
average of 13 per cent. [l01 All of these improvements combined to draw the colliery back 
from the brink of disaster. They certainly helped Wankie to contain the strike which flared up 
soon after the incinerators were introduced in March 1919. Stniking surface workers, 
desperate to protect their access to much-needed extra income earned from the sale of 
firewood to other miners, received no support from the comparatively better paid trammers 
and lashers who comprised the bulk of the mine's labour force. "On being ordered to dump 
the filth on the incinerators instead of the pits (a long way off) the sanitary natives struck", 
explained the district compound inspector. "[Yet] ... with the incinerators the work is much 
easier and by day instead of night. Upon investigation it was found that by hurrying over 
their night work they also worked most of the day in gathering firewood which they sold to 
other mine natives and thus made a considerable revenue. The management on learning of 
this practice knocked the bottom out of the market by issuing free coal to any native wishing 
for it. The strike then soon ended." [l011 
From this point, the storm clouds which had so ominously heralded the onset of another 
labour crisis at the colliery gradually receded. Extremely vulnerable in the past to 
fluctuations in its labour supply because of its low wages and often dreadful working 
conditions, the colliery's position was transformed in the immediate post-war period by 
structural changes in the labour market. Although considerably delayed by the impact of the 
influenza pandemic as it rolled northwards, a pent-up flood of "voluntary" migrant labourers 
from across the Zambezi was released when the Great War ended. It rapidly swelled in size 
between 1919 and 1922 as a devastating combination of inflation, drought and economic 
recession forced thousands of Central Africa's inhabitants to leave their villages in search of 
employment. And as many of those heading south h m  Northern Rhodesia came through 
Wankie on free rail transport thoughtfully provided by the Southern Rhodesian 
Administration, the colliery was perfectly poised to reap the enonnous benefits to be gained 
from this proletarian "harvest of centre and periphery". 
While the great majority of these migrant workers insisted on making their way to better paid 
employment in Bulawayo and the goldmines of Matabeleland and the Midlands, a growing 
number presented themselves at the colliery's compound office during the second half of 
1919 and especially from 1920 onwards. Many of them were Lozi-speakers from nearby 
Barotseland. From the very start, Lozi miners had constituted a noticeable proportion of 
Wankie's labour supply, but their presence expanded significantly after the war because the 
continued embargo on cattle sales in Barotseland, following an outbreak of bovine pleuro- 
pneumonia in 1915, left most people with no alternative to wage labour as a means of 
satisfying the Chartered Administration's tax demands. Despite a temporary set-back in 
September 1919 when a recrudescence of the influenza pandemic caused 30 deaths, the 
colliery's labour supply continued to grow. By mid-1920 the number of black workers at 
Wankie had climbed to ~2,900, and a year later to almost 3,500. Of this total figure, an 
estimated 87 per cent were so-called "Northern boys". More specifically, 73 per cent 
originated from Northern Rhodesia, 14 per cent from Nyasaland, 4 per cent from 
Mozambique, and the balance of 9 per cent h m  Southern Rhodesia itself. Slightly more than 
60 per cent of the labour force was designated as "voluntary". [l021 
Buttressed by a seemingly limitless supply of black labour from the north, Wankie set about 
first rebuilding and then greatly expanding its productive capacity. Coal output in 1919 
recovered somewhat to 5 10,040 tons, compared to the 491,268 tons raised the previous 
year. [l031 As part of a long overdue programme of capital investment, a start was finally 
made on "opening up a new colliery by the same management". [l041 Additional crushing 
plant was also erected, and electrical generating machinery, together with a huge new 
underground ventilation fan, were purchased. [l051 Altogether, ~£150,000 was spent on 
equipping the colliery's No 1 and No 2 shafts, as the different workings were now 
called. [l061 "The Wankie Colliery is well equipped ... and ... in a position to increase its 
output if called upon to do so", reported the Secretary for Mines at the end of 1921. "A new 
incline shaft has been sunk to a depth of 700 feet about five miles distant from the present 
colliery, and this has been done for the purpose of opening up the western section of the coal 
deposit, and which in time will link up with the main workings. A very large area of 
excellent coal is therefore available at Wankie." [l071 Total coal production for the year was 
574,753 tons, valued at £256,8 15. [l081 
This stunning turn-about in Wankie's fortunes was achieved very largely on the Colliery 
Company's own terms. It was all the more remarkable because it occurred against a 
background of intensified struggle, to some extent with black workers, but mainly with white 
miners flexing recently developed trade union muscles. Black labour unrest, where strikers 
were not undercut by hundreds of job-seekers from the north prepared to work for wages 
which lagged far behind the massive increase in the cost of living, was easily suppressed by a 
combination of mining capital and the colonial state working closely together, and the sour 
consequences of the racial division of labour. A strike in 1921, over the right of black 
workers to sell beer in the main colliery compound, was broken after two days by members 
of the paramilitary British South Africa Police, who "marched ... [the strikers] back to the 
pithead". [l091 They were watched by a group of armed white miners. As members of the 
colliery rifle company, they were standing by ready to assist management and police if called 
upon to do so. Other white workers were busy underground keeping the mine's essential 
services operating. [l 101 Always certain of dealing separately with black and white miners, 
the colliery management was usually able to bend both to its will. 
Until 1917 Wankie's despotic management had experienced very little trouble from the 
colliery's white work-force. Soons after becoming general manager, Thomson reduced white 
miners' wages with impunity. Like his counterparts on other large Southern Rhodesian 
mines, Thomson was able to bank on the persistent surplus of white labour throughout the 
pre-war era, and the "much scatteredyy nature of the industry, to "militate against the force of 
white trade unionismy'. [l l l] However, this situation rapidly altered with the outbreak of the 
First World War in 1914. White workers "who left their jobs to enlist in the Great War 
caused the supply of skilled workers to fall below demand at the very moment that the cost of 
living was moving upwards ... [and] as a result those workers who remained behind were 
able to turn the wartime shortage of their skills into improved conditions". [l 121 At Wankie, 
these included shorter hours, lower rents, and higher wages. In 1917, the Colliery Company 
agreed to shorten the working week by three hours, and to reduce all house rents by 50 per 
cent until after the war. The pay of skilled tradesmen was fractionally raised by one penny an 
hour. A year later, the wages of fitters, blacksmiths, carpenters and electricians all rose 
substantially as the colliery tried to overcome the shortage of skilled labour by enticing 
artisans away from other big mines. [l 131 
None of these concessions succeeded in staving off further demands. With the rate of 
inflation accelerating, white workers proceeded to organize themselves into a trade union in 
June 1919. Led by a Yorkshire boilermaker, Herbert Walsh, the Rhodesia Mine and General 
Workers' Association was a general union open to all categories and grades of white miners. 
Enthusiastically supported branches were established on all the large gold mines, including 
Shamva, the Globe & Phoenix, the Cam and Motor, the Falcon and the Rezende, as well as at 
Wankie itself, and with white miners largely united behind it, the RMGWA lost little time in 
confronting mining capital. [l 141 Early in November, Walsh despatched letters to the major 
mining companies in the colony, requesting a general pay increase of 25 percent and a 48- 
hour working week. Specific demands were also addressed to particular mines. All of them 
were invited to attend a conference in Bulawayo at which the RMGWA proposed discussing 
white miners' wages and working conditions in general. "We now formally ask you", wrote 
Walsh to Thomson, "to concede to all your [white] employees as from the first day of the 
present month an increase in Substantive pay of twenty-five per cent on current rates of pay 
plus Climatic allowance of 216d per day and to introduce the 48 hour working week for all 
grades of workmen and an eight hour day, bank to bank, for Miners." [l 151 
Clearly incredulous at the union's effrontery in questioning management's prerogatives, 
Thomson fought hard to keep control of himself. Alternatively placatory and truculent, his 
reply was written with an eye to its eventual publication in the local press. [l 161 Producing 
figures which detailed the wage increases granted in 1917 and 1918, Wankie's general 
manager claimed that there were "single men ... [on the colliery] whose living expenses do 
not exceed E12 per month and who are earning £40 per month in wages, and married men 
whose household expenses do not exceed E20 per month who are earning the same money 
and I question whether the margin of profit was any greater than this before War conditions 
came aboutyy. His letter to the RMGWA further stressed that married white miners only paid 
"an inclusive rental of El per month ... [for] a three-apartment house with kitchen and 
bathroom, fuel, electric light and water laid on and sanitary service". Full board and lodging 
for single white men cost E8 per month, the same as it had done before the war. [l 171 
Each point was rammed home with heavy-handed condescension. "I would like to say in 
connection with workmen at Wankie Colliery", Thomson informed Walsh, 
that since you came to the Colliery and organised a Workers' 
Union, the workers - many of whom never saw a Colliery in their 
life until they came to Wankie - have been holding meetings and 
kidding themselves that they are rather martyrs in a way. I should 
like it fully understood that there is nothing to prevent any man 
who is dissatisfied with conditions at Wankie Colliery leaving the 
place at any time it suits him, and if he betters himself by doing this 
he has my best wishes. [l 181 
Nor would Thomson entertain the union's claim of an allowance "for the Climatic 
disadvantages ... [its] members endured". Although quite prepared to argue on other 
occasions that wages paid at the colliery actually took climatic conditions "into full 
consideration", he now asserted that Wankie's climate was "all a matter of opinion". "I have 
several times had miners return from the Witbank district in the Transvaal1 to Wankie", he 
told Walsh, "because the Witbank district was too cold for their liking. Certainly the state of 
health of the two oldest inhabitants at Wankie is not conducive to the opinion that Wankie is 
unhealthy." [l 191 
But for all his bluster, Thomson was not in a strong bargaining position. The Colliery 
Company hardly relished the prospect of fresh conflict so soon after the protracted crisis of 
the previous year. Much as Thomson might threaten that "if the question is left to ... [me] I 
shall certainly shut the Colliery down rather than give effect to the demands outlined in your 
letter", the decision was not his alone. As even the autocratic general manager appreciated, 
he had his "Board, also the public of Rhodesia, to consider". Consequently, so he advised 
the RMGWA, "I have to get a mandate from my Board which will be transmitted by cable ... 
[but] I am perfectly willing to attend any Conference that may be arranged between 
employers and employed to discuss wages and conditions of living". [l201 
The conference called by the RMGWA met in Bulawayo towards the end of the first week in 
December 1919. It quickly proved abortive. As several companies declined invitations "on 
the grounds that the conditions on the various mines ... varied so considerably that it was 
imperative that each company should be at liberty independently to arrive at arrangements 
with its employees" [121], only Consolidated Goldfields and the Wankie Colliery Company 
actually attended, and it soon became apparent that they too were not serious about meeting 
the union's demands. Discussions were broken off, and on 11 December white workers at 
the Rezende mine near Umtali (Mutare) struck work. Over the next few days the strike 
spread to other large gold mines, until by the middle of the month the Falcon, Gaika, and 
Shamva mines had all been forced to suspend production. [l221 "The position today", 
lamented the Bulawayo Chronicle, "is that three or four hundred white miners are on strike, 
that a number of other skilled European workers are necessarily idle, and that some 
thousands of native workers will be eating their heads off except in so far as they can be kept 
busy about the mines'." [l231 
For four days, Wankie's white miners made no attempt to follow suit. They had earlier 
reached a compromise agreement with the colliery's management. At a series of meetings 
held in the main dining room of the mine's biggest boarding house, Thomson played with 
considerable adroitness on existing divisions between tradesmen such as carpenters and 
electricians, whose expertise the colliery could not afford to lose, and miners, whose 
blasting and supervisory skills were much less difficult to replace. The grievances of the 
former were satisfied virtually in their entirety, while the demands of the latter were met less 
than half-way. As Thomson later confided to his long-standing friend and ally, the Secretary 
for Mines, 
I explained that the Union's demands were ambiguous and that if 
the lower scale was taken some men would be no better off than 
they are at present. If the higher scale was taken Mechanics would 
be getting approximately 3 116 for an eight hours day while unskilled 
men working a ten hours day would be drawing anything from 37/6 
to £2/1/0. On the men realising the absurdity of their demands there 
was considerable commotion. I asked the men to retire and discuss 
their demands in their different grades and meet me later. This was 
done. [l241 
By insisting on seeing each category of skilled workers separately, the general manager also 
succeeded in by-passing the local executive of the RMGWA. "In making this arrangement at 
Wankie the men dealt with me without referring to their Executive", boasted Thomson. 
"They have foregone the principle of an eight hours day and although skilled men are 
receiving practically what the Union asked there is a considerable saving in the unskilled 
section." [l251 
Thomson's satisfaction was short-lived. Within 48 hours, the colliery's white miners had 
been whipped into line by the indefatigable general secretary of the RMGWA. Successive 
telegrams bluntly informed the Wankie coalminers that unless they immediately joined the 
general miners' strike, their local union branch would be "excommunicated". [l261 Perhaps 
more to the point, they would be blacklisted by every major South African trade union. [l271 
And if they still persisted in working despite these dire threats, they would find that the 
Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union had anyway agreed not to move Wankie coal. [l281 The 
logic of Walsh's argument was unassailable, and on 20 December Wankie's white workers 
came out on strike. Their action finally tilted the balance of struggle away from the mining 
companies towards the union. Stymied by the RRWU's refusal to "haul trucks [of coal] from 
Mine if loaded by non-Union men with natives" [129], mining capital was beginning to feel 
the pinch. Just before Christmas, &tails of an improved offer were conveyed to the 
RMGWA, but after some hesitation and not a little dissention in union ranks, it was 
rejected. [l301 Convinced that they had the mining companies on the run, the majority of 
RMGWA members dug in their heels. They were joined at the end of the year by strikers on 
the Globe & Phoenix, the biggest gold mine in the Colony, and when the strike showed signs 
of spreading even further, capital capitulated. On 5 January 1920 the mining companies 
agreed to union terms. [l 3 l] 
Yet neither the mineowners' loss nor the union's win was quite what it appeared to be on the 
surface. As the highest levels of the BSA Company Administration well knew, the 
goldmining companies could easily absorb the cost of higher wages amj shorter hours. 
"Having regard to the increased price obtainable for gold, and to the hours previously 
worked", commented Chaplin, "the mines ... had a certain amount in hand which they could 
afford to give away without suffering any real loss." [l321 For its part, the Wankie Colliery 
Company simply passed the cost of the settlement on to its customers by raising the pithead 
price of coal by two shillings per ton. [l331 But, regardless of their capacity to pay, the 
mining companies emerged from their humiliating experience determined to break the back 
of organised white labour. Concerned about the effekt of "unsettled labour conditions ... upon 
the influx of capital" [134], they decided on united action against the "unreasonable demands 
of Trades Unionism". In November 1920, after extensive discussions between the territory's 
two chambers of mines and its most important mining companies, the Rhodesia Mine 
Owners' Association was established. [l351 
While mining capital prepared the ground for its counter-attack, the sand was shifting 
beneath the feet of the white labour movement. Strains which had been apparent during the 
strike between some local branches of the RMGWA and its Bulawayo headquarters now 
erupted into open conflict. [l361 Another source of bitter division was the emergence of 
craft unionism during the same period. By September 1920, some members of the RMGWA 
and the RRWU were refusing to work with artisans in the rival Amalgamated Engineering 
Union. [l371 The threat, however, of a general strike to enforce "one big Union" was 
confidently ignored by the Administration, partly because "if it comes off, it will start with a 
twofold split in the labour ranks ... [and] ought not to last very long" [138], and partly 
because the supply of semi-skilled and skilled white labour was rapidly improving with the 
return of demobilised soldiers. By as early as July 1921 there were over 100 unemployed 
whites in Bulawayo alone. [l391 
These three developments, none of them to the advantage of white labour, had two 
significant consequences. They encouraged mining capital to seize the first possible 
opportunity to strike back at the RMGWA; and, in doing so, they highlighted the ambiguous 
position of white workers generally. Politically weaker than their fellows on the Rand, but no 
less structurally vulnerable to displaceinent by cheaper, black labour, white workers in 
Southern Rhodesia relied on an informal job colour bar to protect their interests. [l401 More 
than this, because "the very existence of their jobs in many cases was conditional on the 
overall profitability of industries resting on the exploitation colour bars of employers - the 
contract, pass and compound systems which guaranteed the 'ultra-exploitability and ultra- 
cheapness' of black labourers" [141], white miners basically supported the status quo both 
as workers and as whites. It was a contradiction which mining capital never tired of 
exposing. "I would point out to you with all sincerity the dangers which exist at the present 
moment as regards native labour", disingenuously declared the president of the Rhodesia 
Chamber of Mines. "Owing to these strikes they are given responsible positions which, to 
my mind, is aiding and abetting the greatest possible danger in this country, which is the 
possibility of the native superceding (sic?) the white man in his Work." [l421 
Rooted in the racist ambience of colonial society, and assiduously cultivated by mining 
capital, the resulting lack of solidarity between white and black workers fatally undermined 
organised labour's struggle against the mining companies. This was particularly so at Wankie 
where a smaller than average number of white workers confronted a larger than life general 
manager. Insulated at work from black labourers by language barriers and supervisory roles, 
and differentially housed and paid, white miners were none the less ruled by an authoritarian 
regime which brooked no insubordination. "It was what one would expectyy, said Walsh, 
"from a mine manager who has reigned long in an isolated mining camp, and has had little to 
do with trade unionism." [l431 Housing and hospitalization were tied to jobs on the colliery, 
and strikers could and did lose access to one or the other, or both. [l441 Certainly no-one 
could be sure that the general manager, whose "palatial residence" was set on the most 
prominent of the low hills overlooking the colliery [145], would not get to hear what was 
said even behind closed doors. Two members of the local RMGWA executive reported 
directly, if discreetly, to Thomson himself. [l461 
Vulnerable to intimidation and infiltration, the community of white workers at the colliery 
was always tiny. Never totalling more than c90 before the mid-1920s, only 75 of them were 
union members in 192 1 .[l471 Their limited numbers were both cause and consequence of 
the fact that semi-skilled and skilled work at Wankie was not as widely reserved for whites as 
it was on other large Southern Rhodesian mines. In part, this reflected relentless pressure to 
minimise working costs. To some extent as well, it expressed differences between the labour 
processes in gold and coal mining. The much wider working faces of the colliery permitted 
white supervisors to watch over many more gangs of underground black workers than was 
possible in the narrow stopes characteristic of quartz reef gold mining. Taken together, they 
meant that the process of substituting black for white labour was comparatively far advanced 
at Wankie by the early 1920s. Where, for example, the ratio of white to black workers on the 
Globe & Phoenix a few years later was 1:15, at Wankie it was 1:28. [l481 Only grudgingly 
respected by management so long as the RMGWA exerted pressure, the job colour bar was a 
burning issue for Wankie's white miners. [l491 
Matters at the colliery came to a head in February 1921 when Thomson fired a white 
mechanic who refused to service a company car driven by a black chauffeur. [l501 The local 
chapter of the AEU immediately downed tools in protest. They were joined soon afterwards 
by members of the RMGWA whose support for the principle of job reservation easily 
outweighed their dislike for the rival union. At much the same time, a quite separate strike 
started at Shamva over a different issue. This was the excuse which mining capital had been 
waiting for. The RMOA had earlier dismissed out of hand a claim by the RMGWA for a 20 
per cent wage increase, and it now demanded unconditional acceptance by organised labour 
of capital's right to "employ or not employ whom they think fit". [l511 When this guarantee 
was not forthcoming, the mining companies proceeded to arrange a general lock-out. In late 
February, notices were issued at the colliery to all daily-paid men, who comprised the great 
majority of white workers, terminating their services. They were further advised that, while 
access to hospital facilities was being withdrawn "at once", they could stay 'Yn possession of 
the premises they occupy unless they are otherwise required, [and] that light and water 
services will be continued if possible". [l521 
The lock-out eventually ended in the third week of March with union defeat. Their strike 
funds exhausted, white miners watched helplessly as black workers and a "handful of staff' 
maintained production near capacity levels. At Wankie in 1921, as in 1919, "the Natives ... 
worked so well ... that by the third day the output had reached 1,250 tons which is only 250 
tons less than the average daily output in normal times with a full complement of Europeans 
at work". "All the Natives are loyal", reported Wankie's NC, "and doing all tasks set 
them." [l531 White labour's surrender soon turned into a rout. Over the next two years, 
mining capital set about systematically favouring members of the much smaller AEU over 
members of the RMGWA, "and then, once the bigger organization was sufficiently 
demoralized, insisted on retrenchments and wage cuts over the protests of both unions". In 
April 1922 and again in March of the following year, the wages of white miners were 
reduced. [l541 
By the time white workers' wages were again cut, the RMGWA had collapsed. Its branch at 
Wankie had been defunct for nearly six months. But even as the Colliery Company and other 
large Southern Rhodesian mining groups celebrated their crushing victory over organised 
labour, it seemed that they were in danger of losing the battle at the polling booth for the 
Colony's political future. An ardent admirer of Smuts's suppression of the Rand Revolt, and 
supporter of union with South Africa, Thomson did his bullying best to disrupt any 
canvassing for "responsible governmentyy. The local secretary of the Responsible 
Government Association was forced to resign from the colliery, and white miners were left in 
no doubt as to where the general manager's sympathies lay. They accordingly took the only 
revenge which their colour and class permitted. In the Referendum held in October 1922, 
Wankie's white workers voted overwhelmingly against big capital and union with South 
Africa, and for settler self-government. [l551 
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